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guishing exaptation from adaptation by determining whether
character traits have predated, accompanied, or followed evolu-
tion of their functional attributes (e.g., see Blackburn 2000;
Larsen & Losos 1996). The enclosed figures illustrate aclado-
grams of hypothetical taxa, with various possible phylogenetic dis-
tributions of a particular structure (or other phenotypic charac-
teristic) and a function superimposed. The timing of evolution of
a feature is inferred from its taxonomic distribution (Brooks &
McLennan 1991). Thus, in Figure 1A, the presence of a derived
structure (“S”) in three of the taxa indicates that it probably char-
acterized their common ancestor. When the structure originates
first and only later takes on the function in question (as in the
mammary example above), exaptation is indicated (Fig. 1A).
When a function either predates (Fig. 1B) or accompanies (Fig.
1C) evolution of a structural feature, it may represent a case of
adaptation. Phylogenetic analysis also may facilitate recognition of
spandrels. An architectural byproduct should originate as an un-
selected correlate of a particular structure, regardless of whether
the structure itself is selected (Fig. 1D).
In phylogenetic analysis, adaptation and exaptation have the
status of mutually exclusive, competing hypotheses, each of which
can be falsified or supported according to the sequence of evolu-
tionary modification. That a structure antedated the function it
performs, offers a sufficient criterion for recognition of exapta-
tion. However, a function predating or accompanying evolution of
a given structure is a necessary but insufficient criterion for recog-
nition of adaptation; therefore, other criteria (such as those dis-
cussed by Andrews et al.) must also be brought to bear. In effect,
phylogenetic analysis allows us to address, in an evolutionary con-
text, difficult issues whose recognition dates to the writings of
David Hume – notably the difficulty of distinguishing causation
from correlation.
As a practical matter, phylogenetic analysis is useful chiefly
where a robust cladogram can be constructed from taxa that vary
in structural and functional features of interest. It therefore offers
no panacea to evolutionary psychology, where inferences of ge-
netically based behavioral attributes are problematic, particularly
as applied to extinct hominids. However, in principle, phyloge-
netic approaches offer ways to analyze evolutionary sequences and
transformations in historical contexts, and where sufficient data
are available, they can provide clear evidentiary standards for dis-
tinguishing exaptation from adaptation.
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Abstract: Special design criteria are largely unable to discriminate be-
tween claims that specific competencies in judgements under uncertainty
are a result of an adaptation for representing naturally sampled frequen-
cies, or due only to inherent properties of such a format. Because divisions
between these perspectives are thin, evidence via additional criteria are
persuasive only in combination, using inference to the best available ex-
planation.
Andrews et al. point out, quite correctly, that different traits may
require satisfaction of different evidentiary criteria in reaching
some consensus on whether it is an adaptation. This may actually
not be a strong enough statement of the case: In many situations,
one or more of the usual evidentiary criteria may be used to argue
against the case for adaptation. A case in point is the recent de-
bates on the nature of statistical judgements under uncertainty.
The claim has been made that information in the form of fre-
quencies, and in particular frequencies in a natural sampling
framework, is privileged representational format (i.e., that it is the
proper domain for a cognitive adaptation for making statistical
judgements; Cosmides & Tooby 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage
1995). Those in opposition to this claim have pointed out that nat-
urally sampled frequencies create computationally less compli-
cated situations simply by virtue of their inherent properties and
they reject the claim of a specific adaptation (e.g., Evans et al.
2000; Girotto & Gonzalez 2001; Johnson-Laird et al. 1999). In par-
ticular, the counter-hypothesis to an adaptationist explanation is
that, because the frequencies within a natural sampling system in-
herently preserve base-rate information, the set/subset relation-
ships between classes of events become much more easily per-
ceived (see Fig. 1). Instead of an adaptation for understanding and
using frequencies, this explanation rests on claims for a basic ap-
preciation of set relations (which happen to be expressible almost
exclusively in frequentist terms).
In the context of this debate, criteria such as proficiency, effi-
ciency, economy, and reliable production are unable to discrimi-
nate between these two explanations; and in fact, the presence of
these features – attributed to the nature of the inputs (natural 
frequencies per se) – have been used to argue against an adap-
tationist interpretation. One can argue that the proficiency, 
efficiency, and economy of the behavior when using natural fre-
quencies is purely the result of the properties of the numbers
themselves (natural frequencies are simply easier), or one can ar-
gue that these characteristics are a result of a cognitive mechanism
that is preferentially tuned to using these numerical formats in the
first place (natural frequencies are particularly easy because the
mind is designed to work with them).
Discriminating between these two theoretical perspectives is
difficult because the divisions between them have become thin,
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Figure 1 (Blackburn). Cladograms of four taxa, showing the
timing of evolution of a given structure (“S”) and function (“F”),
as inferred from characteristics of the taxa. In A, the structure evo-
lutionarily predates a function that it serves, indicating exaptation.
In B and C, the function respectively predates or accompanies
evolution of the structure; such sequences are necessary (but not
entirely sufficient) indicators of adaptation. In D, a spandrel (X)
has accompanied evolution of an adapted structure (S) as an ar-
chitectural byproduct; here, the structure subsequently is exapted
for a new function (F2).
and there is significant overlap in their predictions. Given this
state, particularly, clear thinking about multiple, alternative evi-
dentiary criteria is increasingly important. What evidentiary crite-
ria can be used, then, in evaluating the adaptationist hypothesis
that natural frequencies not only are computationally simpler (a
point all parties agree on), but also constitute a privileged repre-
sentational format?
Using the criteria of biased learning outcomes of developmen-
tal learning mechanisms would appear to clearly support the adap-
tationist view of frequencies. Children learn whole numbers (fre-
quencies) relatively quickly and easily, but they often develop any
of a number of characteristic difficulties when learning mathe-
matical concepts that deviate from a frequentist perspective
(Geary 1995; Geary & Lin 1998). For example, children often de-
velop misconceptions about the nature of fractions and decimals,
and a large number of these misconceptions are recognizable 
as misapplications of a frequentist interpretation of numbers
(Brase 2002a). Because numbers and mathematics are an aca-
demic topic, however, the possible confounding influences of
teaching techniques can be raised as a concern (e.g., Glassman
1996). It is unclear whether an early proficiency with frequencies
is a result of the evolved structure of the mind or of the exposure
to frequency information and subsequent learning to use such in-
formation.
The criteria of specificity may need to be revised to become
even more precise, such that it again discriminates between pre-
dictions made based on different hypotheses. For example, based
on the notion that an adaptation for tracking natural frequencies
of objects, events, and locations in the real world must have some
set of parsing rules for dividing the world into countable entities,
Brase et al. (1998) proposed that such an adaptation should oper-
ate better on whole objects, events, and locations than on arbi-
trary aspects or features of such entities (i.e., the individuation 
hypothesis). Their subsequent experiments documented that, in-
deed, people’s statistical judgements were hampered in tasks that
required calculations about aspects of objects and the objects
themselves, even if the information was presented in natural fre-
quencies. Statistical judgements about individuated objects were
consistently more successful.
Criteria such as fit with the ancestral environment, rather than
the modern world, are difficult to assess because statistically in-
formed judgements in ancestral circumstances would be translated
directly into behavior without necessarily any explicit and con-
scious mathematical calculations. Although we know that bumble-
bees perform complex calculations of posterior probabilities, we
know little about the performance of human hunter-gatherers in
this respect. Related research, however, appears to support the
idea of statistical judgement abilities adapted to an ancestral world.
Isomorphic numerical information, presented in different formats,
is evaluated and perceived in very different ways, and these phe-
nomena can help in understanding the ways that such information
is cognitively represented (Brase 2002b; Wang 1996). Specifically,
some irrational and inconsistent responses in the face of statistical
judgements become apparent only when using numbers on a scale
that would never have been encountered at any time in evolution-
ary history (e.g., dealing with millions of people).
Ultimately, the adjudication about a trait being an adaptation
must be made as an inference to the best available explanation,
given all the evidence (preferably using multiple, independent,
and converging lines of evidence). As troublesome as it may be,
this means that weaker explanations can continue to survive in
some quarters by selective attention to various lines of evidence
(for example, by ignoring most of the information from outside
one’s own discipline). In this respect, one of the key obstacles to
adaptationist descriptions of cognitive and behavioral traits is the
narrowing of individual interests and knowledge within traditional
academic divisions.
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Abstract: To understand adaptation (and exaptation), a more compre-
hensive view of development is required: one beyond a constraining force.
Developmental plasticity may be an adaptation by natural selection si-
multaneously favored (or sometimes in conflict) at multiple levels of bio-
logical organization (e.g., cells, individuals, groups, etc.). To understand
the interrelationships between developmental plasticity and adaptive evo-
lution I borrow heavily from West-Eberhard (2003) and Frank (1995;
1997). Developmental plasticity facilitates evolution, results in particular
patterns of evolutionary change, and may produce exaptations by design
rather than by chance.
Development is often viewed as a source of exaptation in nature.
However, a comprehensive theory of adaptive evolution must fea-
ture development beyond a constraining force. Another way of elu-
cidating apparent exaptations is the concept of “phenotypic accom-
modation” (West-Eberhard 2003). Phenotypic accommodation is
the nongenetic adjustment among interacting and variable-evolved
components attributable to phenotypic plasticity (West-Eberhard
2003). West-Eberhard’s view of development and evolution incor-
porates the latest findings in the evolutionary study of behaviour, 
genetics, endocrinology, and molecular mechanisms. Indeed, terms
like exaptation (used in isolation from the adaptationist programme)
and developmental constraints may have impeded synthesis be-
tween evolutionary and developmental biology.
Developmental plasticity causes phenotypic variation, which in
turn is screened by selection. Mutations must first influence de-
velopment to influence evolutionary change. Andrews et al. have
discussed development mainly in terms of constraints (although,
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Figure 1 (Brase). Natural sampling versus standard probability.
Differences in computational complexity in calculating the poste-
rior probability (Bayesian inference), attributable to the informa-
tion representation (natural sampling of frequencies versus single-
event probabilities). (Figure adapted from Gigerenzer & Hoffrage
1995.)
